

*BEST COPY
Available*

REFERENCE CENTER LIBRARY

25X1X7 CONFIDENTIAL

25X1A2g

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

25X1A8a

COUNTRY China

DATE:

SUBJECT Political Information: Cliques and Dissidence
in the Chinese Communist Party

INFO. As stated

DIST. 20 June 1947

ORIGIN As stated

PAGES 5
SUPPLEMENT

25X1X6

1. The basic divisions or "cliques" within the Chinese Communist ranks are undoubtedly less clearly defined under the present condition of all-out civil war than they were during the first part of 1946 when there was still some hope of success for the negotiations in which American representatives acted as mediators. However, some of these competing groups may have some significance in future events as change so that dissimilarity or difference of opinion is encouraged, e.g., negotiations are resumed following a military stalemate or extreme reversal in the present war.

2. Regarding actual dissidence among the Communists, the occurrence of outright breaking away from the principal group under MAO Tse-tung has been the renouncing of Communist allegiance by minor military units which have been defeated in battle or have become isolated in Nationalist areas or by occasional disgruntled minor political figures in Nationalist areas who announce their affiliation with "anti-MAO" movements none of which have been shown to have gathered a following of significant size. In many cases the military leaders who have renounced Communist allegiance have not been true Communists but have been opportunist guerrilla or bandit leaders who adopted the Communist label for their own security and benefit and were accepted by the Communists because of their relative military effectiveness against the enemy. (Note: See earlier reports on Troop Defections.)

3. The "splits" in the Communist ranks widely reported during March and April 1947 in the strongly anti-Communist representatives of the Chinese press, such as the Central News Agency releases, probably must be discounted as largely wishful thinking or over-emphasis for propaganda purposes; however, growing influence and more positive leadership by members of the "International Clique", particularly in Manchuria, are quite possible. The likelihood of a definite split, reported by the press to be evidenced by the failure of the Manchurian group to effect the prompt release of the American assistant military attaches recently, seems very slight in view of the increased intensity of the civil war and the present dependence of the Chinese Communists upon the good will and support of the USSR; present conditions are bringing about a more positive alignment of the Chinese Communists with the USSR, regardless of the personal preference of the members of any clique.

Note: General SUN Li-jen, recently returned to Nanking from Manchuria because of personal differences with General TU Yu-ming, stated in a press interview that the Chinese Communists in Manchuria were "busy settling internal party disputes." CC Clique press organs have reported stronger alliances and liaison between MAO Tse-tung, LI Li-san and CHOU En-lai and the Soviets both in Northern Manchuria and North Korea.)

Document No. 6 CLASSIFICATION

NO CHANGE in CLASS.

☐ DECLASSIFIED

Class. CHANGED TO: TS S C

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763

Date: 21 Apr 77 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000600790006-7

25X1X7

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

-2-

25X1X6

4. If the recent return to Manchuria of MA Chan-shan were to be followed by the return of CHANG Hsueh-liang to a high position under the National Government, it is possible that the Young Marshal's younger brother, CHANG Hsueh-shih, and/or other Manchurians now serving with the Communists would lead a substantial military force to desert the Communists and either remain neutral or join forces with CHANG Hsueh-liang. (Note: See early reports outlining the claims of MA Chan-shan and other Manchurian warlords as to their following - real or potential - which would flock to their leadership if they returned to Manchuria in positions of actual power.)

25X1A6a

25X1A2g

25X1X6

25X1X6

Source for paragraphs 5-7: [REDACTED]

25X1A6a

25X1X6

5. The Communists have many cliques, and a basic differentiation must be made between Yenan Communism and Manchurian Communism. The old line Yenan Communists are under the leadership and control of a military group. They are "National" Communists, i.e., they want to become established as the controlling regime within China and have little interest in Communism internationally. Although MAO Tse-tung is not what is ordinarily called a "military man," he is a militarist and falls within this clique. Among the Yenan group there are many elder members of the party such as CHEN En-lai who are inclined by Soviet indoctrination to think of Communism more along international lines. There is also a supporting group of considerable numbers who are non-Communists but who have been convinced that Yenan offers a better hope for democracy and reform in China than does the Central Government. This supporting group has little influence or power and has in general been blinded to the fact that the Yenan regime in general is a military dictatorship, a regime of terror, a regime of forced labor, a regime of economic exploitation, and a regime of political repression.

25X1X6

6. In Manchuria the National Communists, the vehicle of the 8th Route Army. However, the return of Communists indoctrinated in the USSR, notably LI Li-san, and the large majority of them International Communists, into the ranks of the Manchuria Communists have shifted the balance of power within the Manchurian area. There is not only evidence of factional strife between the National or military group and the International or Central Committee group, but with the predominance of the latter there are indications that differences with the Yenan regime are many. The third group on the side of the Manchurian Communists is large in numbers and small in influence. It is that group best exemplified by CHANG Hsueh-liang, although he is not necessarily its leader, who are completely disgusted with the Central Government control and economic landlordism in Manchuria by southern Chinese. (Note: See early reports on Central Government representatives in Manchuria.) This group has two divisions, one sincerely Communist in sympathy and one merely anti-southern.

25X1A6a

is

7. The existence of factions within the Communist ranks evidenced by dissension and difference of opinion and does not mean that any wedge can be successfully driven in under present circumstances. The increased activity in the war and the fact that, in the opinion of the Communists, Central Government efforts are backed by the United States and have been for some time, have strengthened the hand of the International Communists, who form the principal pro-Soviet group. Although the major factions still exist, they have been unified by necessity and have been driven further than ever into the Soviet camp. There can be no turning back by the National Communists from adherence to Soviet Communism and from accepting Soviet aid if they wish to survive and carry out their program. In Manchurian politics the Chinese Communists in general must stick together and create a strong front to avoid any possible shift

25X1X6

CONFIDENTIAL

12

25X1X7

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

-3-

in policy by the USSR towards abandoning them completely in favor of Mongolian Peoples Republic penetrators and the highly organized Korean Communist regime, especially if the USSR were to consummate a "deal" with the Chinese Central Government with a view toward ending the economic paralysis of Manchuria in the interests of both countries. Likewise, Chinese Communists must cooperate with the DPR and the Koreans regardless of the desires of any faction.

25X1X6

Source for paragraph 8: [REDACTED]

25X1A6a

25X1X6

8. There have been recent indications that the close connections and cooperation between the LI Li-san clique of the Chinese Communists and the Korean Communist armies, political leaders, and intelligence agents imported from North Korea meet with considerable disapproval and antagonism from not only the local Manchurians under Communist jurisdiction but from the various anti-International Clique Communist leaders in Manchuria. From the days of the Communist occupation of Changchun a year ago, Korean troops have been very unpopular with the Manchurians. The evidences of increasing political as well as military ascendancy by Korean Communist leaders within Manchuria, particularly in the Chientao region and within Harbin, have produced strong antipathetic reactions among the right-wing pro-Manchurian, and militarist factions of the Communists in Manchuria. There have been no apparent objections to increasing trade in grain and foodstuffs to the Soviets in exchange for military equipment, but LIN Piao for one has been reported as definitely opposed to increasing Korean influence with the Chinese Communist regime in Manchuria. Note: See reports on conflicting stories concerning the alleged plotting of LI Li-san with the recurrence of Communist military successes and Central Government difficulties economically and politically throughout China. The right-wing factions of the Chinese Communist Party may effect a swing from a pro-Chinese Communist policy in Manchuria to a basic position of withdrawal of many of the Korean troops used for the defense and the lessening of Korean political influence in Manchuria. The International Clique-Korean Group coalition will continue to attract certain borderline Communists as individuals away from the main Communist ranks. Increasing factionalism will directly parallel an easing of the Manchurian situation and continued success for the previous basic need for unity and need for increased use of Koreans was conditioned, at least in the minds of many right-wing Manchurian Communists, only by dire necessity.

25X1X6

25X1A6a

9. Note: The recurrent reports concerning cliques within the Chinese Communist Party which occur in Kuomintang propaganda lack enough confirmation from unbiased sources to indicate the degree of truth which lies behind the theme of these reports. Source of the two following paragraphs believes that while cliques certainly exist as they have throughout the history of the party, it is almost impossible to judge whether the alignments follow the patterns described below by Kuomintang sub-sources and to what extent differences have been over-emphasized as a result of propaganda or for the purposes of propaganda; such purposes might be to help the Kuomintang gain the advantage of making the Communists look weaker by apparent disunity and the obviously faction-ridden Kuomintang look stronger by comparison and of promoting the idea that pro-Soviet Chinese Communists are about to gain predominance, thereby encouraging support for the Kuomintang within China and from other nations particularly, the United States.

25X1X6

Source for paragraph 10: [REDACTED]

25X1A6a

25X1X6

25X1X6

10. The cliques within the Chinese Communist Party are:

25X1X8

CONFIDENTIAL - CONTINUED

25X1X7

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

25X1A6a

Note: HSU T'ie-li, born 1876 in Hunan of a peasant family. He went to France in 1919 to study with LI Li-san and YAO Hsu-shih. Visited France in 1922-23. He joined the Communist Party in 1921 and visited the Soviet Union in 1927-29. LIN Po-ch'ang (林伯渠) and HU Yu-chang (吳玉章). None of the members of this clique holds real power in the Communist Party. CHU Te, although still Commander in Chief of the Peoples Liberated Army in name, does not possess the real military power. CHOU En-lai and TUNG Pi-wu have been eyed as rightists and pro-American and therefore are not in MAO Tse-tung's favor. HSU T'ie-li, MAO's former teacher in normal school, is over seventy. HSU, LIN Po-ch'ang and HU Yu-chang are powerless. Among all the elders, CHU Te and CHOU En-lai are the only ones with any influence.

25X1A6a

b. The International Clique which consists of Soviet-educated persons such as CH'EN Shao-yu (陳紹禹), CHANG Jen-t'ien (張聞天) and WANG Chia-se (王稼祥). They have been oppressed by MAO who feels they possess too much foreign indoctrination. The power of this clique was further weakened by the death of CH'EN Pang-shien (秦邦憲 alia PO Ku 博古), in 1946. However, LI Li-san (李立三) present alias LI Min-jan (李敏然) after spending 15 years in the Soviet Union has returned to China and is active in Manchuria as a new and prominent leader of this clique. (Note: The two names most consistently in the Kuomintang press as leaders of an anti-MAO movement have been those of CH'EN Shao-yu and LI Li-san. (a) Perhaps so much space has been devoted to LI because of his history of exile in the USSR as a result of his struggle against MAO prior to 1931 and his recent return from the Soviet Union. One American newspaper correspondent has reported that he could find no evidence of a split in the Communist Party up to mid-December 1946, and that LI had stated the situation was not serious. China did have a split with the Communists in 1946 and to have been a serious one. The prole- (b) Information available indicates that CH'EN is a member of the Communist Party of China and has been active in research work on subjects pertaining to the "No Property Class" and "Revolutionary Methods." After his return to China he was appointed Communist Secretary for Kiangsu. He is a member of the Communist Party Committee and was once a CCP delegate to the Comintern. He holds no military rank. In 1943 he was a member of the Communist Central Executive Committee. He has held numerous other posts. In 1945 he was variously reported as ill or under detention by the MAO Clique but was later reported as one of the Communist delegates to the KCC.)

c. The Intimate or MAO Clique which includes MAO's intimate supporters such as LIU Shao-chi (劉少奇), FEN Pi-shih (任弼時), CH'EN Yun (陳雲), LI Fu-ch'ang (李富春), K'ANG Sheng (康生) and LU Ting-yi (陸定一). They believe in Marxism as adapted by MAO rather than the pure Marxism of the International Clique.

25X1X8

25X1X7

CONFIDENTIAL CONTROL

-5-

25X1X6

25X1A6a

25X1X6

Source for paragraph 11: [REDACTED]

25X1X6

11.

The elders, CHOU En-lai and TUNG Pi-wu are considered as rightist and pro-American by extreme left-wing Communists. Communist members of the middle level such as CH'AN Chia-k'ang (陳家康), CHANG Wen-chin (章文晉), LUNG P'eng (龍濟), CH'IAO Lu (喬水) and K'O Po-nien (柯柏年) are counted to be in the same clique. These middle level Communists comprise the English experts of the Party. They have received some Americanized education and were not as anti-American as members of the other Communist cliques. They, however, are becoming more anti-American because they believe the United States still supports the Kuomintang. Moreover, they are badly hurt politically in that they have not been promoted in the Party because they are not sufficiently anti-American. Since their ideas resemble more or less those of left-wing Kuomintang members they as well as CHOU and TUNG, find friends among the latter group. Note: This has been confirmed by a Communist official (previously reported). [REDACTED] 25X1A2g

25X1A6a

25X1X6

Source for paragraph 12: [REDACTED]

25X1A6a

25X1X6

12.

Rumors circulating exclusively in a narrow Shanghai Soviet circle include the following:

a. LI Li-san is backed by the Soviet Military Command of the Far East

b. Leftist Communists, headed by LI Li-san are insisting upon the shifting of the Chinese Communist headquarters from Yenan to Manchuria

[REDACTED] group. The formation [REDACTED] is personally [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] received years of indoctrination in the USSR

d. Soviet Embassy officials in Nanking are afraid that some of the Chinese Communist delegates in Nanking will desert the Communists and reveal important secrets concerning Soviet manipulation in China.

25X1X6

Source for paragraph 13: [REDACTED]

25X1A6a

25X1X6

13. As a result of the numerous quarrels among the Communists which began during the peace negotiations with the Nationalists, dissenting members of the Party formed such groups as the "Anti-LAO Movement" and the "Anti-Civil War Comrades Association." The activities of these groups have spread throughout Nanking, Shanghai, Hongkong, Macao and Kwangtung Province. These groups have gained some influence and have become quite active recently. The Shanghai Communists now in the process of withdrawing at the insistence of the Central Government, regard the formation of these groups as a serious matter, but they do not have time to cope with the problem.

25X1X7

~~CONFIDENTIAL CONTROL~~